Showing posts with label consciousness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label consciousness. Show all posts

Monday, 28 April 2008

Consciousness: summary

razorsmile @ Flickr

A summary on how to revise Consciousness:

1. Get sorted on the philosophy. Do you think functionalism cuts the mustard? If not, make sure you have a strong case for it. There's always a question on this.

2. Organise the various theories; get intimate with them. If you're clever you'll create your own (psst: steal little bits from everyone else's and call it yours). A3 paper might be handy here.

3. Go through the evidence - stuff like behavioural data, neuroimaging, brain damage, sleep and wakefulness, attention and arousal - and match it to the theories. What supports what and what undermines what? Now you can write about good and bad theories. There is always a question on this.

That is all.

Saturday, 26 April 2008

Consciousness: questions

thomashawk @ Flickr

General

On the basis of neuropsychological data reject two theories of consciousness.

Discuss three theories of consciousness. Reject two of them and support one.

Discuss a theory of consciousness, explaining how it might account for sleep and waking, anaesthesia and coma data.

Is consciousness localised?

Is consciousness a property of the brain?

What evidence should a theory of consciousness account for? What is the best theory that does this?

Discuss some of the philosophical problems of consciousness.

What are the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems of consciousness? Discuss an attempt to solve the ‘hard’ problem.

Is the study of consciousness a scientific or philosophical endeavour?

The Department for Children, Schools and Families contacts you asking for a 1500 word brief on what to include in a new A-level called 'Consciousness'. Write this brief explaining, with justification, what to include.

Discuss how consciousness might arise out of the activity of nervous brain tissue.

Brain Damage - Cortical

Cortical damage tells us little about the nature of consciousness. Discuss.

What do brain damaged patients tell us about consciousness?

Consciousness is a product of the cortex. Discuss.

What can split-brains tell us about consciousness?

Can a language-based theory of consciousness be supported by cortical brain damage data?

Brain Damage - Subcortical

What can subcortical damage tell us about consciousness?

Discuss the role of subcortical systems in the maintenance of attention and cortical arousal.

A scientific paper reports that damage to a small region of the subcortex leads to an obliteration of consciousness. The authors conclude that they have localised consciousness. Have they?

What role might the thalamus play in consciousness?

What do studies of sub-cortically brain-damaged patients tell us about consciousness?

"Time is as important as space in the neurobiology of consciousness" (Adude, 2008). Discuss.

Attention

Is attention consciousness?

What can the study of attention tell us about consciousness?

Sleep

What can we learn about consciousness from the study of sleep and waking?

What can REM sleep in particular tell us about consciousness?

The time the majority of humans spend unconscious at night is one of the most fertile periods for the understanding of consciousness. Discuss.

How can the neurobiology of sleep be useful in supporting or rejecting theories on the nature of consciousness?

"Freud said dreams were the royal road to the unconscious. Actually, the neurobiology of dreaming (REM) may be the royal road to the understanding of consciousness." (Abloke, 2008). Discuss.


Functionalism

Will machines ever be conscious?

Assess the arguments for and against the claim that the brain is functionally equivalent to a computer.

Criticise functionalism.

Is the problem of consciousness one that can be addressed scientifically?

“If all that matters is the computation, we can ignore the brain’s wiring diagram, and its chemistry, and just worry about the ‘software’ that runs on it” (Dennett, 2001). Critically evaluate this functionalist argument.

Can cognitive psychology provide a complete account of consciousness, or are alternative approaches required?

The film The Matrix takes as an assumption that human consciousness can be represented computationally. Can it?

Why might the "whir of information processing" (Chalmers, 1995) be insufficient for explaining first person experience.

"Consciousness is not borne of algorithm" (Antifunctionalist, 2008). Discuss.

Neurofunkers

In the last posts in this mini-series on Consciousness we were philosogeeks, the one sitting on the edge of the party worrying about things like whether girls actually exist, whether human minds can ever understand girls and how the hell to chat them up.

We are now going to be neurofunkers and just assume that girls exist and we can understand them. Neurofunkers aren't practising their chat up lines by themselves in the corner; they're out there using them, seeing what happens, throwing away the duds and refining the good ones (if I have lost you in this weird club, substitute 'girls' with consciousness and 'chat-up lines' with 'theories'.)

As neurofunkers you create and test theories. But what should a good theory do? At its most basic I would say that it should predict the most with the least. That is, it should make predictions and it should be parsimonious (Hawking, 1996; Popper, 1963). It should explain.

But what should it explain? Broadly speaking, the answer is experience, in sickness and in health. So, any decent account of consciousness should have an answer for sleep and wakefulness, how anesthesia works, how brain damage has the effects it does, how attention and arousal work, how normal functioning operates and possibly even the point of consciousness, its function.

I won't go into too much detail but here is a list of the theories you should all have a good knowledge of:

Multiple Drafts Theory -
This is the theory of Dennett and Kinsbourne (1992), which suggests are brains are running multiples processes concurrently. Does all this information collect in some centre? They argue that this is not the case, “…the Multiple Drafts model avoids the tempting mistake of supposing that there must be a single narrative (the "final" or "published" draft) that is canonical - that represents the actual stream of consciousness of the subject” (p. 185).

Micro-Consciousnesses -
This position states that the brain is a parallel processor with many different consciousnesses arising from modularity. The champions of this idea are Zeki and Bartels (1998)


Consciousness from Language -
According to some, language allows outputs from other brain areas to be commonly understood and integrated to form conscious experience. The main advocate of this position is Gazzaniga (1995).

Consciousness from meta-representation -
It is entirely possible that rather than language (like this is written in) being the overall interpreter of brain wide functions some other system is involved in re-representing information from disparate brain areas into one unifying ‘language’. It might be this representation that is responsible for consciousness. Such is the view of Singer (1998) who says, “Brains capable of processing signals at a conscious level seem to have the ability to represent the outcome of their distributed computational operations in a common format. These metarepresentations comprise protocols not only of sensory and motor processes but also of the state of value-assigning systems. Thus brains that have consciousness possess a representational metalevel at which internal states are explicitly represented: they have what one might call an inner eye function....." (p.1829)

Representational Theories of Consciousness -
According to this position the brain is a reality emulator, representing the world in neural code, which once complex enough can create consciousness. Damasio (1998) says "[l]iving creatures such as we are, produce core consciousness when [they are] caught in the act of representing themselves when they represent other things." For Domasio the brain uses structures designed to map both the organism and external objects to create a fresh, second-order representation. Other champions of this position are Pare and Llinas (1995) and Llinas and Pare (1996). Sensory input, according to these authors, amends the current model in the brain. It is worth restating this point because their argument is subtle. Sensory input does not lead to internal images in the brain but alters the pre-existing model. In particular, they suggest that 40Hz resetting allows for the model to be changed. The whole position is quite well captured by Humphrey (2002), “Now imagine that a new form of sense organ evolves, an ‘inner eye’ whose field of view is not the outside world but the brain itself" (p.75).

Graded representation -
According this position the quality of information is critical to consciousness. The proponents of this position are Farah and Feinberg (1997) and broadly speaking the higher the quality of information the greater probability there is of it being associated with consciousness. Note similarities with Chalmer's panprotopsychism 'information theory' and how this view is essentially non-eliminative materialism.

Multiple Consciousnesses -
The suggestion with this position is that there may be qualitatively different types of consciousness. For instance, Block (1995) suggests there is access consciousness (A) and phenomenal consciousness (P). Another position put forward by Damasio (1998) suggests the existence of core and extended consciousnesses. He says, "[b]oth are internal phenomena of the mind but core consciousness is more basic than the extended variety. Extended consciousness depends on core consciousness. Both occur automatically....no amount of willpower can either make them happen or prevent them from happening" (p.1880). Yet another position advanced by Bogen (1997) suggests there is a central core or ‘me-ness’ to experience, which he links to subcortical areas, in particular the intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus. The content of this experience, he argues, is linked to activity in the neocortex.

Binding -
If there are indeed multiple consciousnesses or a host of parallel systems working away to solve their specific problems and consciousness experience is holistic then either this is an illusion or somehow these disparate sources of information are bound. Thus functional specialization must be overcome by functional integration. Ignoring the possibility that it is an illusion for the moment, there are a number of different versions of this binding idea:


Cartesian Theatre/Localized Processes -
First, binding could occur at convergence zones in the brain either locally or globally. This is the idea that information is integrated in space. Schacter et al (1988) is a supporter. According to these authors there is a single 'Conscious Awareness System' in the brain. This system is separate from perceptual, cognitive and action systems and has the special function of generating conscious experience. A similar stance is taken by Posner and Rothbart’s (1998) who suggest that the cingulate gyrus is the organ of focal awareness and consciousness. Milner (1995) makes the claim that the dorsal pathway is unconscious whereas the ventral pathway is conscious. Crick and Koch (1998) make the claim that visual consciousness (although not visuomotor abilities) may reside in the frontal lobes. Baars (1998) who theorizes that converging information in special areas are lit up by attentional processes. Dehaene & Naccache (2003) also advance a similar theory called the Global Workspace Model, this is a good theory and you should know about it.

Distributed consciousness -
Instead of a localised area in the brain for consciousness this position states that consciousness might be more distributed throughout the brain. This is the position of Kinsbourne (1992).

Temporally bound information flow -
Second, binding could be synchronized. That is, information could be integrated in time. This is the view of Pare and Llinas (1995)Llinas and Pare (1996). According to these authors the sensory input updates the various parallel system of the brain which is bound together using a 40Hz temporal oscillation. They suggest the thalamus is crucial in mediating this oscillation.

Function -
Epiphenomenalism -
This is the idea that consciousness serves no function but is rather an emergent property of a system as complex as the brain. Consciousness in this view has no function to speak of. The often-used analogy is that consciousness is like smoke over the factory. See also Velmans (1991), ‘Is Human Information Processing Conscious?’ He finds a lot of it isn't, so why the need for consciousness?

Adaptive -
As Humphrey (1987) (slightly inaccurately) put it, “either we throw away the idea that consciousness evolved by natural selection or else we have to find a function for it” (p.378) (It is slightly inaccurate because of course it doesn't need a function, it could be epiphenomenal.) To my mind, asking this question is of fundamental importance. Historically, psychology was satisfied to describe behavioural phenomena – it was a descriptive science. All that changed when the gene-centred view came into the arena. Instead behavioural scientists were apt to ask, “What function a certain behaviour served?” Only really by the 1990s had scientists begun to accept that humans were not exempt from this logic. The idea that consciousness may have some function is a very recent one although I believe it is one of the most crucial questions we can ask. Recognizing the function served by consciousness could be the key to understanding it. A number of theories abound about the function that consciousness serves.

Gray (2004), for instance, suggests that the brain is a massive parallel processor, although these servoprocesses, as he calls them, are not infallible ones. For this reason the brain must have some sort of error detection. By modelling the world including its enduring features such error detection can occur by comparing expected and actual models.

Dehaene and Naccache (2001) have suggested that consciousness is for i) durable and explicit information maintenance, ii) novel combinations of operations, and iii) intentional behaviour all constitutes such mental operations that require consciousness.

Ramachandran & Hirstein (1997) say qualia states allow information to be kept ‘alive’. This occurs because qualia states endure in short-term memory.

According to Gregory (1998) qualia may allow the present to be flagged in contrast to past knowledge.

***

The job your revision should take into this delightful subject is to match up the evidence to these theories not just positively, as in 'this supports this', but negatively so that you can say 'this evidence puts a spanner in the works for...' I say this last bit because you'll see in the past papers quite a lot of the questions ask you to rip another theory apart. This will set you up to do just that.

My advice is to set out all the theories on big bit of paper and then go through the course notes adding data that supports or rejects. Have a couple of favorite theories and preferably create your own.

Also have a couple of bad ones to talk about (psst - Gazzaniga [1995] is flimsy. Also panprotopsychism can be taken down a notch with a crisp argument for functionalism). There is always a question asking you to support or reject a theory with evidence or discuss the scientific progress into the problem of consciousness. Knowing how theories and data dance with each other will set you up nicely for this.


Also keeping theories in the forefront of your mind will hopefully keep a lid on the feeling of being overwhelmed by the thousands of papers you could read in this area. Just like I said in an earlier post, without a course blueprint you can't properly be selective. Well, without theories to constrain your choice of evidence you'll be lost in Consciousness.

You're about to...

As I've been put in the mood for Consciousness today (that phrase does weird things if you over-think it), I was reminded of this recent Nature Neuroscience paper, a rehash of the classic Libet paper. Read it here.

How to chat up consciousness

patrisha @ Flickr

Ok, last time I said how there were those who liked to talk about chatting up consciousness and those who actually did it. Here we are going to cover the former and specifically talk about what the problem is and how to approach it. This is a difficult area to get your head around. Let's try and make it a bit clearer.

First, make notes about what the problem is.

I find this is best stated by Chalmers (1995). You need to read this paper. Here you go. Briefly, he indicates that consciousness has two problems: the easy one and the hard one. The easy one is equivalent to the daily findings of cognitive science: how memory, attention, vision and so on work. Chalmers says these problems have computational solutions. In his words, the hard problem of consciousness is “the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field."

Second, make notes about approaches to solution of this problem.

I'd split them up like this:

Fuck it. We'll never know

Also known as mysticism this view explains the problem by denying that science will ever be able to explain consciousness. This was a position popular in the scientific community until about 30 years ago. At the centre of the issue is that while consciousness is the most piquant subjective experience, science is objective - and never the mismatch shall be resolved.Searle (1998), however, argues that this problem arises from a confusion about two different kinds of objectivity. The first kind of objectivity is something that is epistemically objective (or know as fact), like “The building has two front doors”. Epistemically subjective information would be something like, “The doors of the building are unattractive”. The second flavour of objectivity is ontological (that something exists). Thus returning to the building one will find the two front doors existing. However, ontological subjectivity would be feeling pain from closing one’s finger in a door. What Searle argues is that science concerns itself with epistemic objectivity and not epistemic subjectivity. However, he also claims that it can concern itself with ontologically subjective events.

There is also a related view that consciousness is something that is systemically insoluble by humans minds (maybe the dolphins or mice know?). You can find this in the writings of McGinn (1989, 2000)

It's not a problem

There are those who explain the problem of consciousness by denying it's actually a problem. Dennett (1993) is one of these. He suggests that “[p]ostulating special inner qualities that are not only private and intrinsically valuable, but also unconfirmable and uninvestigatable is just obscurantism." (p.450). To this Searle (1998) replies, "I would not have thought that this thesis - that consciousness could be treated separately from consciousness was widely held until I discovered it in several recent books on consciousness (Crick 1994, Edelman 1989). The basic idea is that the problem of qualia can be carved off from consciousness and treated separately; or better still, simply brushed aside. There are not two separate problems, the problem of consciousness and then a subsidiary problem the problem of qualia. The problem of consciousness is identical with the problem of qualia, because conscious states are qualitative states right down to the ground. Take away qualia and there is nothing there." (p.1938). I love academic cat fights.

Another approach under this category is to suggest that integrated holistic conscious experience is an illusion. Proponents of this view suggest that the brain has many parallel processes occurring and we make an error in assuming these processes are connected. Dennett (1991) is the principle advocate of this position. One problem I have with this is that consciousness does have an objective ontological reality to us - it's there now, it's the feel of your arse on the seat - and that needs to be explained (maybe a broader explanation than that of just arses though.) Bechtel (1995) also agrees that we must question the notion of a unified consciousness and he offers a way out suggesting that qualia may not be an objective fact but rather an illusion mediated by language. This idea of grand interpreter is also in Gazzaniga's work.

Physical accounts of consciousness

Then there are the physical account of consciousness. They assume that our current understanding of the world is good enough to understand consciousness (eventually).

Digital functionalism - a biggie. Worth knowing lots about this. At its most basic it says that consciousness is maths. Once we understand the brain's maths we understand consciousness. There are lots of objections including:
- Inverted spectra/qualia (Block and Fodor, 1972)
- Multiple realizability (Block, 1980)
- Intentionality (Searle, 1980)
Then there are the rejoinders. Read the article I wrote on Functionalism for more.

(Note, I call this digital functionalism. This means 1s and 0s. Neurons on or off. I would consider quantum explanations still functionalist because they are still computational, just the mechanics of the computation are of a different flavour. This might be a handy technicality for an essay on functionalism. That is, you can knock down digital functionalism and replace it with quantum functionalism.)

Eliminative Materialism - This position is essentially a reductionist one advocating that science can deconstruct higher order properties into lower order properties of the physical world. Once we understand every neural interaction, we understand consciousness. This is just functionalism given a neural reality.

Non-eliminative Materialism - Like eliminative materialism this position suggests that consciousness can be explained by the physical world. However, unlike eliminative materialism it is impossible to understand higher order properties simply by reference to the lower order properties. Rather at certain levels of complexity there are emergent properties of a system. As Searle (e.g. 1998, 2000) asks, ‘Is a single water molecule wet?’ Again, this is functionalism and a more sensible functionalism in my view. You can't explain the Internet by talking about a single line of code in the Google system. See Churchland and Churchland (1997) for more.

Exotic physics - There are those that think (digital) functionalism is an adequate way of explaining consciousness, like Nagel (1993). He suggests that “…it is inevitable that the pursuit of [an account of consciousness] will lead to an alteration of our conception of the physical world.” (p.3). He thus goes onto to claim that, “[i]n the long run, therefore, physiological psychology should expect cosmological results." (p.3). Penrose (1994) and Hameroff (1998) are the key proponents of this type of fundamental revision. More recent examples include explorations of deep quantum chemistry by Ventegoot et al (2006). A good review can be found in Faber, Portugal and Rosa (2006). Note: you don't need to understand quantum physics to talk about this.

Non-physical accounts of consciousness

Chalmers (1995) comments on such exotic mathematical theories of consciousness: "At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process why tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory."

As a result Chalmers offers up panprotopsychism because the explanatory gap between the easy and hard problems of consciousness will never be bridged by a) functionalism, b) a radical revision of our understanding of matter or c) by assuming that to understand consciousness is beyond the capabilities of the human mind or science. Panprotopsychism argues that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe. He suggests "that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental....a theory of consciousness requires the addition of something fundamental to our ontology as everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness".

Chalmers argues that the Universe’s basic feature is information and this can be either physical or phenomenal. This view is therefore a dualist one, although one compatible with the scientific world view. Information is something, according to Chalmers, that is over and above the properties of physics. Chalmers indicates that this position might indicate how the experiential arises from the physical. Furthermore, this experience is graded according to the level of complexity of the system. "Where there is simple information processing, there is simple experience, where there is complex information processing there is complex experience. A mouse has a simpler information processing structure than a human, and has correspondingly simpler experience; perhaps a thermostat, a maximally simple information processing structure, might have maximally simple experience?" This theory is important because it is alone in creating the explanatory bridge between matter and experience.

Nonetheless the critics have attacked; for example, Searle (1997): "What is it about the functional state that does the job of 'giving rise' to consciousness? It is he says, information. Not information in the ordinary common-sense meaning of the word in which I have information about how to get San Jose, but in an extended 'information theory' sense, in which any physical 'difference that makes a difference' in the world is information. According to Chalmers conception of information, rain hitting the ground contains 'information', because it makes changes in the ground. But if consciousness arises from information in this sense then: consciousness is everywhere. The thermostat is conscious, the stomach is conscious, there are lots of conscious systems in my brain of which I am unconscious, the Milky Way is conscious, there are various conscious systems in any stone..and so on...This absurd view...is a direct consequence of attempting to explain consciousness in terms of 'information' in this denuded technical sense of the word....It is to Chalmers credit that he sees the consequences of his views; it is not to his credit that he fails to see that they are absurd.” (pp. 155-156).

Overall, if you get the philosophy of consciousness sorted you'll have a sure question to answer come the exam. To date, there has always been a question about it. Note that frequently the question "Can science explain consciousness" or some variation of it appears. Just because the word science is in there doesn't mean you have to talk about science. You can easily take that question on at the philosophical level (i.e. you could answer 'No, science can because science is based on functionalism and functionalism doesn't work' or whatever.)

Next time we'll move on to more specific theories of consciousness and what sort of things you should be doing in your revision with them.

Revising Consciousness


I've had a question about how to revise consciousness, which gives me an excuse to talk about it, something I have been itching to do for a bit. Consciousness is a feisty course and you could devote a career to it and still have more to read (although Semir Zeki, I have heard, claims he has read every single paper ever written about vision. Must have been nothing good on TV that weekend.) Because the course is unlike any other in this respect, I'll talk about the specific approach I took to revising it.

The first thing to make clear is that there is no answer at the end of the revision road with Consciousness. You won't reach a point, like you might in other courses, where it suddenly clicks and you understand it. Even the guys whose living depends on studying it freely admit they know next to nothing about it. Along with a Theory of Everything it is probably the biggest question in science. The nice thing about this is that there is professor-student parity. As long as you don't depart from logic and explain stuff, any new account is a good one. In other words, Consciousness is a course in which to flaunt your creative and critical prowess.

The second thing is to toss out the window the need for a definition of consciousness. One thing definitions carry is theoretical baggage. Definitions come after solution to the problem and in the grand scheme of things the problem of consciousness hasn't really got dent in it. This may feel a bit uncomfortable as you have always been trained to define your terms. Let it go! If you do need to cling to something just call consciousness 'all first person experience'.

Next I would ask what the course is getting at, the course blueprint. I think this captures it:

The philosogeeks and the neurofunkers

The study of consciousness is a bit like a party. You have the people sitting around the edges talking about how to chat the girls up and then you've got the people on the dance floor doing just that. These are the philosogeeks and the neurofunkers.

The philosogeeks are really interested in how you approach the problem of consciousness. They worry about how we can explain first person subjective experience using third person objectivity. Some think it's not possible: consciousness is something that science wont crack. Others contend that a fundamental revision of our understanding of the physical world is needed to understand consciousness and make it amenable to science. Others still say that everything is fine and dandy: science has the muscle to get a hold on consciousness.

The neurofunkers, on the other hand, just get on with it. They just assume that pulling girls is possible. Where they differ is in their exact ideas about consciousness. For example, some argue that consciousness is localized to specific brain areas whereas others advocate that consciousness is distributed across the brain. Many of these different positions are supported by evidence from healthy subjects' behavioural data, brain damage; attention and arousal studies; sleep and wakefulness – in short, neuropsychological data.

Thus, the course is dualistic: half explores theories of consciousness whereas the other half examines neuropsychological data and how they can support or undermine those theories. Now, at least, you can organise you thinking around these two things. It is possible to concentrate more heavily on either of these areas, depending on what you prefer but knowing both gives you more power in exams.

In the next posts what I'll do is talk a bit about philosophy first and then move onto neuropsychology.