Saturday 26 April 2008

Revising Consciousness


I've had a question about how to revise consciousness, which gives me an excuse to talk about it, something I have been itching to do for a bit. Consciousness is a feisty course and you could devote a career to it and still have more to read (although Semir Zeki, I have heard, claims he has read every single paper ever written about vision. Must have been nothing good on TV that weekend.) Because the course is unlike any other in this respect, I'll talk about the specific approach I took to revising it.

The first thing to make clear is that there is no answer at the end of the revision road with Consciousness. You won't reach a point, like you might in other courses, where it suddenly clicks and you understand it. Even the guys whose living depends on studying it freely admit they know next to nothing about it. Along with a Theory of Everything it is probably the biggest question in science. The nice thing about this is that there is professor-student parity. As long as you don't depart from logic and explain stuff, any new account is a good one. In other words, Consciousness is a course in which to flaunt your creative and critical prowess.

The second thing is to toss out the window the need for a definition of consciousness. One thing definitions carry is theoretical baggage. Definitions come after solution to the problem and in the grand scheme of things the problem of consciousness hasn't really got dent in it. This may feel a bit uncomfortable as you have always been trained to define your terms. Let it go! If you do need to cling to something just call consciousness 'all first person experience'.

Next I would ask what the course is getting at, the course blueprint. I think this captures it:

The philosogeeks and the neurofunkers

The study of consciousness is a bit like a party. You have the people sitting around the edges talking about how to chat the girls up and then you've got the people on the dance floor doing just that. These are the philosogeeks and the neurofunkers.

The philosogeeks are really interested in how you approach the problem of consciousness. They worry about how we can explain first person subjective experience using third person objectivity. Some think it's not possible: consciousness is something that science wont crack. Others contend that a fundamental revision of our understanding of the physical world is needed to understand consciousness and make it amenable to science. Others still say that everything is fine and dandy: science has the muscle to get a hold on consciousness.

The neurofunkers, on the other hand, just get on with it. They just assume that pulling girls is possible. Where they differ is in their exact ideas about consciousness. For example, some argue that consciousness is localized to specific brain areas whereas others advocate that consciousness is distributed across the brain. Many of these different positions are supported by evidence from healthy subjects' behavioural data, brain damage; attention and arousal studies; sleep and wakefulness – in short, neuropsychological data.

Thus, the course is dualistic: half explores theories of consciousness whereas the other half examines neuropsychological data and how they can support or undermine those theories. Now, at least, you can organise you thinking around these two things. It is possible to concentrate more heavily on either of these areas, depending on what you prefer but knowing both gives you more power in exams.

In the next posts what I'll do is talk a bit about philosophy first and then move onto neuropsychology.

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